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THURSDAY
SEPTEMBER 2, 1954

Ken Royall came to see me this morning. He thinks the French have demonstrated their complete undependability as partners in the military defense of the West.

Joe Kingsbury Smith had a long talk with me, exploring possible solutions for the return of German sovereignty and granting the Federal Republic the right to rearm.

I had lunch with Jean Monnet, who maintains the EDC is not dead but only sorely wounded. The pro-EDC people are issuing manifestoes and [redacted] engaging in political maneuvers in the hope of toppling Mendès from power when the Parliament is called back into session. However, one can make no sound predictions on the French political situation, and the wisest thing to do now is to try to disengage from the debris an alternative policy. This may prove impossible, since the French have said they will not accept unrestricted German sovereignty with the right to constitute a national army and general staff, and the Germans have announced they will accept no discriminations against them. It may be that one side or the other will give way, but it is just possible that a prolonged stalemate would lead to the revival of the supranational idea.

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I went to see John Hughes and Ed Martin, and talked to them about the American and British proposals for a conference. Nothing definite has been decided about this.

Doug Dillon saw Mendès at Marly this morning and sent the following report on their meeting:

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"TO: SECSTATE WASHINGTON. 938.

"INFO: BONN 193 LONDON 257 MANILLA 5.

"Mendès asked me to come and see him this morning at Marly. When I arrived he said he was very tired and suggested that we take a walk in the park, which we

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did for about 45 minutes. He said that he was presently engaged in remaking his government which he considered to be a necessary waste of valuable time. He said he intended to replace the three pro-EDC Ministers, who had resigned, with men who were in favor of EDC and who had voted that way in the Assembly. He was finding this task very difficult as the important pro-EDC figures would not join his government, and those pro-EDC men who were willing to join did not seem to have enough importance or ability to hold ministerial rank.

"Regarding the three vacancies created by the earlier Gaullist resignations, he said it was his present intention to take possibly one of the three ministers who had resigned back into his government to indicate that there was no enmity between him and the Gaullist Party. In answer to a question, he said that he would probably take back Chaban-Delmas, but that he definitely would not take back General Koenig.

"After this conversation, Mendès said that he had been pleased by the Secretary's statement regarding EDC, as he had feared and expected something much stronger. I told him that he should be under no illusions as to the strength of the feeling on the subject in Washington and he said that he realized how the US felt and he fully realized what a great disappointment the defeat of EDC had been. He then repeated at some length his earlier arguments to show that there never had been a majority in favor of EDC. He said that if Monday's vote had been taken on EDC directly rather than on a procedural question, and if the government had been allowed to vote as they pleased, there would have been 350 votes against EDC.

"I told Mendès it was difficult for us to understand why he had not wished to go back to Brussels for a second try. He replied that he had been willing to do this but that René Mayer in his speech had accused him of sabotaging the

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Brussels Conference and that therefore it made it necessary for him to ask specific approval of his conduct at Brussels which the pro-EDC people were not willing to give. He said he considered that René Mayer had broken the agreement which had been reached in the cabinet earlier regarding his willingness to go back to Brussels.

"Mendès then said that he had intended to make a dramatic move immediately after the close of the EDC debate. He had intended to send Adenauer a telegram asking if he could come to Bonn to visit Adenauer to discuss the situation. He said that this telegram had been all drafted and was ready for transmission Monday night when he was informed of the Reynaud petition and the fact that the debate was going to be reopened on Tuesday. This made it impossible for him to send a telegram at that time and then yesterday had come the report of Adenauer's meeting with the public statement indicating that the Germans did not wish to talk further with the French. Mendès said that he could well understand the German position and was not too upset by it as he considered it primarily a question of internal politics. He quoted Talleyrand in this connection, saying, "That which is exaggerated is of no importance." Mendès said that nevertheless he would like to go immediately to Bonn to see Adenauer but that he did not know just how to proceed. If he should ask Adenauer if he could come and see him and Adenauer should say "no", Mendès felt that the result on French opinion would be catastrophic coming after the way Adenauer had rebuffed his approaches at Brussels. I asked Mendès if he could not have François-Poncet make discreet inquiries and Mendès said that this would not be possible as it could not be kept from the public. He reverted to this subject two or three times during our conversation and finally mentioned it again just as I was leaving. I got the definite

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impression that he hoped that we would informally contact Adenauer to see if he would be willing to receive Mendès at Bonn. If Mendès were to receive informal assurances from us that Adenauer would be receptive to such a suggestion I am sure that he would proceed immediately to suggest to Adenauer that they hold a meeting at Bonn.

"Mendès then said he was not quite clear on what the program was from now on as the Secretary had spoken of a meeting of the NATO Council, which of course was agreeable to him, but at the same time the British had suggested an Eight-Power meeting. He said that he was inclined to prefer the British suggestion as it foresaw a meeting taking place very promptly and he felt that there was no time to waste.

"Mendès said that as far as France was concerned he had committed himself to ratify the Bonn Conventions subject to a clause postponing German rearmament. He said there would be initial difficulties with the French Assembly but that he was prepared to make this a question of confidence and that he felt that, given the full backing of the U.S. and U.K., he would be successful in obtaining the approval of the Bonn Conventions by a large majority. He said that the Communists would of course oppose the Bonn Conventions and that this would please him as it would disassociate the Communists from his majority. He emphasized that the vote on the Bonn Conventions must be simple and uncomplicated and something that would be easy for the Assembly to understand. He expressed some concern at the German position that the Bonn Conventions were no longer satisfactory. He said that he could fully understand why they wanted something more and personally he was in favor of giving it to them. However, that would require a complicated renegotiation and would make the problem with the French Assembly much more difficult. Mendès' argumentation along this line was practically identical to that in Deptel 623 to

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Bonn (rptd Paris 802, London 1254). He said that he felt that after the Bonn Conventions had been ratified, it would be possible to make steady and rapid progress toward the granting of full sovereignty to Germany, but that what was important was to get a favorable vote on the first step.

"Regarding a defense contribution for Germany, he said that he had no very clear cut ideas but that there should be immediate negotiations and a final agreement should be reached no later than the first of November. The final agreement should be simple and easy and very short. When I asked him if he had any particular thoughts in mind on this subject he said only that the most important thing from the French point of view was to have a close association with the U.K. Therefore, he would hope for some sort of a little NATO including the U.K. He repeated almost word for word what he had told me at our last interview regarding his ideas on German rearmament (Embtel 747).

"Finally, Mendès said that a Saar settlement would have to be part of the final arrangements with Germany. I asked him whether this meant that a Saar settlement would be tied to the settlement of the question of rearmament. Mendès replied he personally would rather it was only tied in with the rearmament problem but that René Mayer had during the last week spoken twice in the Foreign Affairs Committee and once in the Assembly to the effect that he would never approve the Bonn Conventions until a Saar settlement had been reached. If René Mayer proved to have much following on this subject it would be necessary to reach a Saar settlement simultaneously or prior to the ratification of the Bonn Accords. Mendès said that he felt he could settle the Saar in two-days' conversation with Adenauer. He said that he had not studied the question in great detail and did not want to commit himself on the detailed wording of the Teitgen-Adenauer agreement but that he was in full accord with the general outlines of that

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agreement. He said that in his view the fact that the French Assembly had been against supra-national clauses in the EDC did not mean at all that the idea of European unity should be shelved, and that he still foresaw the Saar settlement taking place in the framework of a future European political community.

"During the course of our conversation Mendès asked me what the U.S. and U.K. proposals were on the question of giving sovereignty to Germany. I told him that I hoped to be ready to see him tomorrow, Friday, with Jebb to give him our joint proposals but that I was not yet free to do so. I had talked to Jebb just before going to see Mendès and Jebb said he had as yet not received any instructions on this subject from London but he would telephone and clear the matter up during the course of the day. DILLON."

From the above, it would seem as if Mendès were laboring under several dangerous illusions, and does not realize how tremendous and complex are the difficulties presented by the German problem.

We got down to Versailles late and spent the night there.

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